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Introduction
There is a substantial body of literature on the effect of ethnic diversity on the delivery of public commodities and the quality of government (e.g. Easterly & Levine, 1997; La Porta et al, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al, 2007) . The innovation of the present line of inquiry is to extend the underlying literature by assessing the relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness. Accordingly, tribalism represents a more holistic measurement compared to ethnic diversity because it is a proxy that more closely reflects actions by individuals than 'ethnic diversity' which reflects a situational element (Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015) .
We postulate that countries with higher levels of tribalism should deliver less government effectiveness. In other words, the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities should be less apparent in countries with high levels of tribalism. Hence, the theoretical underpinnings associating ethnic diversity to low institutional quality are the same employed by this study. Meanwhile, as sustained earlier, tribalism represents a broader concept, relative to ethnic diversity.
In fact, tribalism is a doctrine which consists of unreasonably favouring individuals within a tribe or group of tribes. It is considered as an ethnic instrumentation by Mankou (2007) . According to Jacobson and Deckard (2012) , it entails scourges of corruption, rent seeking, inequality, indigenous population and group grievance. Hence, this note contributes to the existing literature by assessing the relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness.
The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data
Data on government effectiveness/efficiency is obtained from the dataset compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) at the World Bank. The indicator is based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance from a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. Government effectiveness/efficiency is distributed between 2.5 and 22.5 (best).
To measure tribalism, we use the tribalism index data by Jacobson and Deckard (2012) . It is a weighted aggregate of the detailed components, which ranges from a score of 0 (the hypothetical lowest score) to a score of 1 (the highest). Figure 1 shows that there exist substantial variations in tribalism across the world. The highest consumption levels can be found primarily in developing countries.
As for control variables, we include openness to trade (or KOF index of economic globalization) from the literature (Dreher 2006 , Dreher et al., 2008 (2010); legal origin and geographical location to account for recent debates in the institution's literature (e.g. Kodila-Tedika, 2014 ; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2013; Asongu, 2012) . Following the trend in the literature, legal origin is captured by distinguishing between the English, French, German, Scandinavian and socialist legal heritages (La Porta et al., 1999) . We estimate the model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. Table 1 presents the basic results. Model 1 estimates the relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness/efficiency without a conditioning information set (or control variables) while the remaining models include some controls, unless where these were dropped due to multicollinearity. With the exception of the regional indicator, the control variables, included in these regressions, display the expected signs and are statistically significant in several cases. Per capita income is statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 3 and has the expected negative sign. Higher income is thus associated with high government effectiveness/efficiency (Asongu, 2014) . The results show, however, that democracy does not have a significant effect on government effectiveness/efficiency. The KOF index of economic globalization is statistically significant at the 10% level and has the expected positive sign. Globalization thus improves government effectiveness (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015) .
Results

Basic results
The variable of interest is negative and statistically significant in all cases. Accordingly, the coefficients of the tribalism are statistically significant at the 1% level in all regressions. In the first column that does not include other determinants, the tribalism variable accounts for 40.8% of variations in government effectiveness/efficiency. 
Robustness checks
We verify if the established negative relationship withstands further empirical scrutiny in a plethora of robustness checks. In order to further improve the estimations, we follow the empirical approach on M-estimators by Huber (1973) using Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS). As Midi and Talib (2008) have noted, compared to the OLS approach, the advantage of these robust estimators is that they simultaneously fix any issue arising from the existence of outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variances). We find in Table 2 that the signs and significance of the variables across specifications are consistent with those of Table 1.
In Table 3 and Table 4 
Conclusion
We argue in this article that the level of tribalism is likely to affect the government effectiveness/efficiency enjoyed by the population of a country. Our econometric analysis has established that countries with high-tribal populations generally enjoy bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. 
